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I. Introduction
The rule of law and respect for human rights in Latin America are
under assault. Internal armed conflict spanning many years' duration in
several Latin nations, criminal gangs and international crime
organizations, international terrorist cells operational in the region,
government corruption, loss of faith by citizens in their government
institutions, the emergence of neo-feudalism in rural territories and areas
of vital strategic importance, increased pressures on indigenous cultures,
and the unregulated exploitation of natural resources by legal and illegal
actors-all conspire to cast the Latin American world into a region of
transborder conflict, lawlessness, and long term political and social
instability.
This article examines the impact of internal armed conflict,
terrorism, and human rights violations on the rule of law in Latin
America. Further, this article considers what steps effected states must
take. The United Nations ("U.N.") and the Organization of American
States must take a leadership role in stabilizing the region. This can be
accomplished by encouraging needed reforms within vital government
and legal institutions and by reaffirming that protection of human rights




First, we will examine several facets of what comprises the rule of
law as we perceive it in the Western World. We will then discuss our
understanding of the rule of law in the context of internal armed conflict,
terrorism, and human rights in Latin America. In the course of this
examination, we will look at comparable situations in Northern Ireland
and the Middle East in order to understand better the challenges
confronting Latin American states and international world bodies
involved in protecting human rights, fortifying struggling democratic
states, confronting armed conflict and terrorism, and preserving the rule
of law. We will then conclude with several proposals for achieving
sustainable security and pragmatic respect for human rights in the region.
II. The Nature of the Rule of Law in Latin America
Before referring to the state of the rule of law in Latin America, we
must agree on what the "rule of law" means and what it implies. The
rule of law is a misused, misunderstood, and at times maligned concept,
and beyond our notions of law encompasses issues as diverse as property
ownership, the aspirations of civil society, and retribution during regime
change or following in the aftermath of internal armed conflict.2 The
broad scope of the rule of law raises many questions about its very
nature.
For example, is the rule of law a term to describe due process,
justice, and equality before the law? How do we determine the extent to
which a state possesses the rule of law? Do we refer to the existence of
judicial authorities, government institutions, and rules and procedures in
the codes that embody the promise of justice, equality, economic
development, and citizen participation? Or does the rule of law refer
only to an even and equal manner in which government institutions
contend with its citizens? Are we referring to how fair and just the
system is? Are we talking about how much discretion a government has
over its citizens? Does the rule of law assist economic growth? Does it
protect human rights? Is the rule of law an essential precondition for
democracy? Are we referring to the rules and procedures by which the
state enforces its laws, and do we assume that the rule of law entails that
the state is transparent, public, clear and explicit, and not arbitrary or
subject to political exploitation by the state?
The answers to these questions depend on one's understanding of
the notion of the rule of law. This is a challenging task because the rule
2. See U. S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INST., RULE OF LAW
CONFERENCE REPORT JULY 6-9 2004 11 (2004) [hereinafter "U.S. ARMY REPORT"],
available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428140&Location =
U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
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of law embraces several concepts, 3 and each concept focuses on different
institutions, 4 norms, and aspects of the legal system.5  Central to
understanding the meaning of the rule of law is recognizing that
problems with current rule-of-law analysis, criticism and even reform
policies arise directly from pitfalls inherent to the definitions used.
A. Historical Roots of the Rule of Law
Law professor Miguel Schor, in his thorough paper on the rule of
law in Latin America, sets forth a clear picture of the evolution of rule of
law institutions in the region.6 Professor Schor emphasizes that the rule
of law in the Americas is informed by the region's historical roots, and
that a thorough examination of the legacies at play in the hemisphere is
3. "The benefits of the Rule of Law depend on how the Rule of Law is defined."
Melissa Thomas, Rule of Law in Western Thought, http://go.worldbank.org/EB3
RDGI5L0 (last visited May 14, 2008). Many associate the rule of law with notions of no
ex post facto laws, presumption of innocence, dual jeopardy, or habeas corpus. Some
include additional elements including the supremacy of the law, a concept of justice,
restrictions on the exercise of discretionary power, doctrine of judicial precedent,
common law methodology, prospective laws, independent judiciary, legislative power
exercised by parliamentarian body and restrictions on the executive's exercise of
legislative powers, and moral basis of law. See, e.g., Mark Cooray, The Rule of Law
http://www.users.bigpond.com/smartboard/btof/chap l80.htm (last visited May 14, 2008).
Mark Ungar defines the rule of law as "comprising an independent effective
judiciary, state accountability to the law, and citizen accessibility to conflict-resolution
mechanisms." MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
LATIN AMERICA 1 (2002).
In commenting on a GAO report, USAID defined rules of law as follows: "The rule
of law embodies the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law,
fairness, and both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights; it is
founded on a predictable, transparent legal system with fair and effective judicial
institutions to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts
of both organizations and individuals. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE: RULE OF LAW FUNDING WORLDWIDE FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993-1998 13
(1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99158.pdf
4. See Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law:
Implications for Practitioners 6 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Paper No. 55,
2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view
&id=16405&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl ("Conceptual confusion may have arisen because
practitioners working to build the rule of law abroad have developed an entirely different
way of looking at the concept, based not on end goals but on institutions to be
reformed.").
5. The expression "rule of law" is held by some to be ambiguous at best. See
Rainer Grote, Rule of Law, Rechtstaat and Etat de Droit, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
UNIVERSALISM AND DEMOCRACY-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 271 (Christian Stark ed.,
1999), (reviewing the ways in which the phrase has been used in Europe and the United
States).
6. Miguel Schor, The Rule of Law and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America
(Mar. 2003) (unpublished paper, prepared for the 2003 meeting of the Latin American




central to understanding the political and social tensions that affect
nation building, development, and security in the region. Schor points
out that modem Latin American nations are the embodiment of a
centuries-old system in which a ruling elite maintains control by
manipulated interaction among and within the three branches of
government in order to preserve the status quo of a ruling class
composed of large landowners in control of vast natural resources, and a
powerful merchant class capable of manipulating trade and commerce to
influence the political landscape.
The post-colonial societies that emerged in Latin America in the
early nineteenth century were the defacto birthright of the Creole elites
intent on taking charge of their hard-won economic, political and social
destiny. Because they feared granting political power to those
unfortunate enough to have been born to the lower classes, the new elite
created institutions designed to preclude the masses from consolidating
rights established on paper or in spirit in the early decades of democracy
building.7 During the late eighteenth and well into the nineteenth century
and despite several fits and starts and a handful of civil wars and border
conflicts,8 Latin American nations implemented civil codes and
constitutions in the course of modem nation building. But a closer look
at the rules and constitutions reveals the sinister methods used by the
elite to exclude the masses. For example, the vote was limited to free
men with property who enjoyed the support and loyalty of a military
class fully prepared to silence dissension.9 Women in many Latin
American nations were considered second class citizens, were prevented
from fully participating in legal and political affairs,10 and were subject
to the authority of their fathers, brothers, or husbands (the patrimony
7. Id. at 13. See also ROBERT J. FERRY, THE COLONIAL ELITE OF EARLY CARACAS:
FORMATION & CRISIS 1567-1767, at 7-8 (1989) (describing in his Introduction how elite
families, particularly among the Caracas gentry at the close of the colonial era, took steps
to "retain both wealth and political power for many generations").
8. Latin nations engaged in a number of brief armed conflicts in the 19th and early
20th centuries. Notable among these conflicts are the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-
1870), fought between Paraguay and combined forces of Uruguay, Argentina, and the
Empire of Brazil; the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) between Chile and combined
Peruvian and Bolivian forces; the War of the Schools (1876-1877) and the Thousand
Days War (1899-1902), both Colombian civil wars; and the brief border conflict known
as the Ecuadorian-Peruvian War (1941-1942).
9. See Schor, supra note 6, at 14.
10. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American
States, Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Status of
Women in the Americas, Ch. III(B) Civil and Political Rights of Women,
OEA/Ser.LN/II.100 Doc. 17 (Oct. 13, 1998), available at http://www.cidh.org/
countryrep/Mujeres98-en/Chapter/ 203.htm (summarizing the advancements obtained
for women's rights in the last two decades of the twentieth century, following
constitutional, human rights, and political reform movements throughout Latin America).
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system). Intolerance of religions other than Catholicism was widespread,
and the inquisitorial system of criminal justice persisted well into the
latter half of the nineteenth century. Leaders obtained power through
personal connections and strategic familial alliances"' rather than through
talent and hard work (the patronage system). 12 The ruling caudillos, with
little more than a nod to the constitutions and the laws they had created
in moments of republican ardor, infused order by relying on personal
loyalties and a rigid patronage system with roots in Roman antiquity.
Society was glued together by the charisma and alliances of these
caudillos and not by the recognition and application of the legal norms
they acknowledged-at least on paper.' 3  Economic fiat and laws
protecting property rights were consolidated and infused with a
formalism' 4 that the elite preserved from generation to generation.
The twentieth century brought minor improvement in the
imbalances of power in the emerging Latin American states and can best
be characterized as a series of governments struggling to provide some
type of representation to a growing middle class and labor groups while
still protecting the interests of the traditional ruling elite. 15 Schor notes
that while a growing bureaucracy began to provide civil and government
services in an effort to consolidate and exert central control, individual
rights remained subordinated to social rights, a phenomenon that made
the Latin American constitutions very lengthy, overly legalistic, and
unsustainable.16 For example, over the last two hundred years, Colombia
and Peru have had no less than thirteen constitutions, while Brazil has
had ten constitutions. 7
11. See FERRY, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that colonial elites emphasized the
importance of marriage in maintaining their power and station in Latin American
society); id ("Much is made of the value of marriages of prominent creole women to
peninsular Spaniards, who brought both prestige and new commercial contacts to the
family.").
12. See KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 639 (1975); see also Luz E. Nagle, The Cinderella of
Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 345, 352 (2000).
13. Schor, supra note 6, at 14.
14. For a brief discussion on formality of the Latin American legal system, see Luz
E. Nagle, E-Commerce in Latin America: Legal and Business Challenges for Developing
Enterprise, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 859, 914-18 (2001) (noting that formalism "is such that the
amount of written documents, signatures, and stamps required to conduct commercial
transactions presumes that every citizen is lying unless he produces written, documentary
proof that he is telling the truth").
15. See Schor, supra note 6, at 15. See generally William Aviles, Paramilitarism
and Colombia's Low-Intensity Democracy, 38 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 379 (2006), available
at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-17434946-ITM (last visited
May 14, 2008) (discussing the tentative emergence of democratic controls over the
Colombian government and military classes).
16. Schor, supra note 6, at 15.
17. See Nagle, supra note 12, at 352-53.
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During the post-colonial decades of the nineteenth century, the
executive branch gradually consolidated power and "became the
managers of a great bureaucratic organization aimed at providing welfare
and promoting economic development,"'' 8 but at the same time, the
executive used its decree powers to implement economic policies that
excluded those perceived as sectors or individuals not necessary to
achieve development. When economic disputes arose that threatened the
interests of the elite, the settlement apparatus of the bureaucratic
institutions would kick in and stonewall resolution of the disputes or
manipulate the process in favor of the elite. Where threats to the power
of the elite persisted, the military could be called upon to quell unrest.1 9
There was little need, then, for an impartial judiciary to settle disputes
between private litigants, or to provide a forum to address a citizen's
grievances against the state or its representatives. Instead, the judiciary
became a loyal and dependable "rubber stamp" for the executive and for
the larger ruling class.20 For example, the existence of complicated
license systems and protecting intellectual property became an obstacle
21
for the growth and maintenance of business competition. Citizens
found that the process to reach the courts was too complicated, complex,
costly, and lengthy, and failed to accommodate various groups and their
interests.
22
As the laws developed, they excluded a large part of society and
stymied the enforcement of legal rights for those outside the elite class.
Nearly two centuries after the end of the colonial rule, these and other
legacies leave Latin American nations still struggling to determine the
precepts, foundations and the limits of a pluralistic form of government.
Democracy and the rule of law remain tenuous at best and the purview of
the few.
B. Evolution and Concept of the Rule of Law
In the last decade, concern for preservation of the rule of law has
evolved from the realm of scholarly discourse to become the focus of
proactive political debate and policy implementation throughout Latin
18. Schor, supra note 6, at 16.
19. See Luz E. Nagle, Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary and the Constitutional
Court, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 66 n.56 (discussing how the military protects the
interests of the traditional elite).
20. See Schor, supra note 6, at 16.
21. See Ronald Corbett, The Judicial Enforcement of Intellectual Property in
Argentina-Is Society Being Served? 10 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 3, 11 (2001) (noting
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America-a phenomenon that transcends borders and legal systems in
the region. The "globalization" of the rule of law discourse in Latin
America promotes the rule of law as a manifestation of identifiable
elements and norms that the governments must embrace in order to attain
the requirements of stability, transparency and accountability necessary
to attract international investment to the region.23 Indeed, the capacity of
an emerging nation to embrace a rule of law paradigm "helps determine
democracy's character and future prospects." 4 Such a trend is evident
among the Latin American states where rule of law projects and
initiatives have proliferated in the last three decades through the
implementation of uniform rule of law projects-a "reform menu"-to
achieve a rule of law standard suitable to stimulating confidence,
political stability, and foreign investment.25
Problems with current rule of law analysis, debate over the meaning
of the rule of law, and even reform policies instigated under the title of
"rule of law" programs arise directly from pitfalls inherent in either the
lack of a clear definition and/or confusion with the definitions in use and
disregard for value of the law undergoing reformation.26
But despite the proliferation of efforts to stabilize and enforce the
rule of law, there remains significant confusion over the definition of the
"rule of law" as it should be implemented and applied to the Latin
American region.
C. Distinguishing "Rule of Law "from "Rule by Law"
The concept of the "rule of law" identifies a vital component of a
western tradition with roots in Roman antiquity that centuries later fully
developed during the birth of liberal constitutionalism centuries later. It
is best characterized, in the words of Max Weber, as "legal
domination., 27 If we talk about the rule of law, we are talking about a
concept in which the law is autonomous from the government. Because
23. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998,
at 95, 95-96.
24. See UNGAR, supra note 3, at 1.
25. See Carothers, supra note 23, at 95-96 (discussing how rule of law reforms have
been arranged by subject matter).
26. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMp. L. 75
(2008) (noting that rule of law reform initiatives ignore " much of any value to existing
law anywhere in the region," and "undermines state law and institutions while
simultaneously purporting to support them. It keeps a range of questions off the table,
depriving all of the Americas of any real engagement with the pre-reform options
embodied in the law of Latin American states. And, it weakens the position of many
Latin Americans within international legal politics.").




it is autonomous from the government, institutions, and codes, the rule of
law is supposed to provide checks and balances to curb the government's
power.
Therefore, the two concepts of rule of law and rule by law are
absolutely different. When we consider the role played in democracy
building by such entities as the United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID") and the World Bank, it can be argued that the
rule of law projects imposed upon Latin American governments in the
name of mutual assistance, foreign aid, economic development, and
regional security, are little more that reform regimes designed for
recipient governments throughout the region to continue ruling by law
and not by rule of law.
The "rule by law" is a legal order dependent upon and subject to the
government as the power regulator, but otherwise containing no
substantive moral standards. 28 Under a rule of law regime, "[l]aw is an
instrument of the government, and the government is supreme and above
the law."2 9 What we are talking about is oppression of those desiring
meaningful reform and democratic representation by the very democratic
regimes claiming to have the best interests of the citizenry at heart. Rule
by law allows a small group of politicians to cover themselves in a cloak
of democratic models to continue policies that preserve the corrupt
political institutions that have tarnished the democratic process in Latin
America since independence from European hegemony.
Rule by law imposes no brakes or restraint over a government's
actions; it can act capriciously, arbitrarily, and unpredictably. Rule by
law "means that a government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed
and announced beforehand, 30 rules making it possible to foresee with
reasonable certainty that government authority will use coercive force
under some circumstances, and to intervene in an individual's personal
affairs "when justified for the good of the state.' We have seen such
manifestations of the rule by law in the recent past in Latin America,
particularly in the form of military juntas in Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay.32
28. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 98-99
(2001).
29. See Li, supra note 27.
30. See FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1994) (1944).
31. Id.
32. See Paul C. Sondrol, 1984 Revisited? A Re-Examination of Uruguay's Military
Dictatorship, 11 BULL. OF LATIN AM. RES. 187-203 (1992) (discussing Uruguay's
military dictatorship from 1973 to 1985). See generally RENE HARDER HORST, THE
STROESSNER REGIME AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE IN PARAGUAY (2007) (discussing the
Stroessner dictatorship from 1954-1989); PAUL H. LEWIS, GUERRILLAS AND GENERALS:
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The rule of law, on the other hand, is founded on a legal order
independent from the government-a legal fiction framing a set of
norms, values, and legal traditions defining a code of conduct and
boundaries necessary for the maintenance of a civil society and
responsive government. 33  The authority bound in the rule of law
depends on its degree of autonomy and not on the "instrumental
capabilities" imbued in the laws promulgated by government. 34 Such a
degree of autonomy and independence gives the law a distinct and
separate structure from other organizations.
As an independent legal order, the rule of law serves three
functions: first, the rule of law regulates government power; second, the
rule of law provides equality before the law; and third, the rule of law
ensures procedural and formal justice. 35 The rule of law as a regulator of
state power limits arbitrariness and abuse,36 and restrains government
"tyranny" because the law and not the government is the supreme
authority. 37 To limit government abuse and discretion, the laws and
procedures are pre-enacted and publicized, which means that government
officials must obey the presently legal positive law, and that they must
conform to restraints on their law-making power, including their power
to change the law as mandated by natural law, customary law, and
respect for human rights.38
The rule of law as equality before the law implies that no man may
be above the law and that the rule of law offers equal protections
"without prejudicial discrimination. 39  The rule of law should be of
"general application and consistent implementation,, 40 can be obeyed41
42and put in writing. In the political and social fabric of Latin America,
recognition of the rule of law under this concept has at times seemed
remote and ephemeral.
The third meaning of the rule of law pertains to formal or
procedural justice, and demands that procedures and decisions are
deduced from the legal system itself and that the rules must be applied
consistently. The rules defined under a rule of law paradigm are
THE "DIRTY WAR" IN ARGENTINA (2001) (discussing the conflict between the military
junta and leftist insurgents between 1976 and 1983).
33. See Li, supra note 27.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law? 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331,
342 (2008).
37. See Li, supra note 27.
38. See id.
39. See Chesterman, supra note 36, at 342.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 70.
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predictable because they were previously enacted and proclaimed, fair,
transparent, and consistently applied.43
D. Rule of Law Concepts
The lack of a well-developed notion of the meaning of the rule of
law is a serious concern, especially in light of past efforts to reform legal
institutions. When reading about the rule of law in Latin America, one
gets the impression that the rule of law is analogous to the existence and
preservation of certain institutions, the need to reform legal institutions,
the need for new rules and codes, and the training of individuals to adjust
to newly created institutions.44 Writings make reference to "building the
rule of law, 4 5 to "governments being bound by the rule of law," and that
the rule of law is essential for economic and political development,46 and
many more epithets. Most of the scholarly writings define the rule of
law from one specific method or a combination of formal, substantive,
and functional methods.
1. The Formalism Definition
A formalist approach considers the existence or nonexistence of
specific, recognizable criteria in the legal system and describes
"instrumental limitations on the exercise of State authority. 47
Formalism seems objective and clear because it avoids rendering
conclusions based on subjective analysis and observation.48 This method
looks at the presence of provisions such as publicly known rules,
43. See Li, supra note 27.
44. USAID describes promoting and assisting the rule of law in Latin America and
the Caribbean as follows: "Mexico launched new Freedom of Information legislation,
modeled in part on U.S. legislation, with assistance from USAID." See Press Release,
USAID, USAID Promotes the Rule of Law in Latin America and Caribbean Democracies
5 (Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/Iocations/latinamerica_
caribbean/pdf/dg-ruleoflaw.pdf. "Under USAID/Bolivia's Administration of Justice
(AOJ) program, Bolivia now has an oral, adversarial criminal justice system that is
significantly more transparent, efficient, and participatory." Id. "There are more
personnel working in justice systems, and more of them receive specialized training.
Judges and staff are better qualified, and more are selected based on merit systems. In
most countries, justice budgets are larger, productivity is higher, and backlogs are
smaller." Id. at 10.
45. See Belton, supra note 4.
46. See Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for
Economic Development? (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ. 2d series
Working Paper No. 275), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
WkngPprs_251-300/275-kd-china.pdf.
47. See Chesterman, supra note 36, at 340.
48. See Matthew Stephenson, The Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy,
http://go.worldbank.org/AQ875YH880 (last visited July 16, 2008).
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impartially applied norms, rules that are clear and prospectively applied
by an impartial and independent judiciary, and judicial review of
government action. In formalistic definitions "the rule of law is
measured by the conformity of the legal system to these explicit
standards., 49 A formalist classification, however, concentrates on the
existence of procedures applied to implement the norms, but loses sight
of the content, consequences and applicability of those laws.
The formalistic approach puts great importance on the written laws
("the law on the books") and how the laws are implemented ("law in
action"). In fact, Latin American countries proclaim rule of law
principles in their official documents and substantive legal norms, but in
actuality, the principles alluded to are often missing or misconstrued, or
distributed unevenly. The result is a vacuum between what is ideal law
on the books and the operative law in action.50
Relying on this approach because Latin American countries revise
old laws and promulgate new laws under the rule of law rubric, one
could conclude that most of these countries have a well-founded rule of
law. However, this strategy ignores many important and relevant factors
that affect the rule of law.
One very important element is the exclusion of sections of the
society and the suppression of different viewpoints. Drafting is often
done by small groups of lawyers who share a common ideological
viewpoint, and according to Hammergren, "This tends to produce
lopsided codes which optimize one set of values or intended impacts
while ignoring many others." 51
Another factor affecting the rule of law under this formalistic
approach is that governments perceive that they need to expedite the
implementation of certain statutes, codes, and reforms. In fact, in the
name of free market reforms, governments not only have rushed to enact
new legislation, thereby sacrificing the same market reforms they try to
put in place, but they have used questionable tactics to achieve support
for the legislation.
Presidents have curtailed public debate and opposition using
presidential decree powers to implement new market reform legislation.52
49. See id.
50. According to Professor Joseph Thome, this situation is not unique to countries
that had authoritarian regimes during the 1970s and 1980s. See Joseph R. Thome,
Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 691, 701 (2000).
51. See Linn Hammergren, Code Reform and Law Revision 2 (USAID Ctr. for
Democracy and Governance, Paper No. ACD-022, 1998), available at http://
pdf.dec.org/pdf docs/PNACD022.pdf.
52. See Judith Teichman, Latin America in the Era of Globalization: Inequality,
Poverty and Questionable Democracies 9 (Univ. of Toronto Ctr. for Int'l Studies,
[Vol. 27:1
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In the long run, speed and exclusion sacrifice the same policies the
government sought to implement. "The very process of pushing through
the reforms, combined with the concentration of economic power that
accrued afterwards, has undermined democratic deliberative
mechanisms. 53 Events in the region indicate that disaffected citizens
often react to their political isolation by violent protest, creating chaos
and causing material damages.
In the name of market reforms, governments have used questionable
tactics to gain supporters. One is the "material exchange relationship" of
granting "monopolies for extended periods of time," or the
implementation of "provision of export subsidies to companies already
exporting or in a position to do so," to the exclusion of others.54 Another
old but still effective government tactic is clientelism whereby
government officials selectively distribute patronage to trade unions and
key leaders in exchange for political support.55 These methods of
exerting force and control all have a detrimental effect on the rule of law.
It has been well recognized that establishing the rule of law entails
giving priority to laws that encourage investment and empowerment.
56
Yet, codes and legislation promoting market reforms come at a high cost
to several Latin American nations. Several are the product of
governments employing coercive means to implement changes while
demonstrating "a tendency to cronyism and to the establishment of new
forms of rent-seeking. 57  Various sectors of the society have been
excluded by the powerful businessmen who "gained preponderant
influence over public policy as a consequence of their closes personal
ties with political leaders." Norms were implemented not with
transparency but as a result of "under the table business deals in which
political leaders received high kickbacks, or businessmen fronted
business deals of politicians. 58
The speed under which legal changes take place also affects
relations between governments and citizens, with citizens frustrated by
the lack of time given to comprehend fully the changes and their impact.
Working Paper 2001-2, 2001), available at http://www.utoronto.ca/cis/working-
papers/2001-2.pdf.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 10.
55. See id. at 10-11. For example, in Mexico, the government allowed a leader of
the state petroleum workers union to set up his own contracting company. Id. He cashed
in on the state petroleum company's move to make greater use of outside contractors.
Using clientelistic methods, Argentina's President Carlos Menem channeled funds
toward the social funds and selectively increased salaries of those who supported his
policies. See id.
56. See U.S. ARMy REPORT, supra note 2, at 60-61.
57. See Teichman, supra note 52, at 4.
58. See id.
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The rush to implement laws reinforces Latin Americans' belief that their
governments' authoritarian impulses are yet another aspect of abuse of
power.
Further, the formalistic approach neglects to consider how the
constant implementation of new laws and codes causes instability and
inconsistent application of laws, and renders rules unpredictable because
of the speedy way in which they are enacted. Rules then become unfair,
without transparency, and selectively applied. The Justice Studies
Center of the Americas analyzed various reforms in the region and found
that rules without implementation fail to consolidate the much needed
rule of law. In every country the Center examined, the following
problems were found:
[A]n overall inability to manage the scheduling and inter-agency
coordination necessary to hold oral hearings, which translates to
delays, loss of prestige of the systems vis-A-vis its users, misuse of
resources, and deterioration of public relations and of transparency.
Even incarcerated defendants fail to appear for hearings due to
problems with prison transport services or communication systems
between the courts and the prisons. The reform process has not
systematically dealt with the administrative challenges implied by
oral hearings. The entire administrative apparatus was developed for
processing cases in the written system and is, therefore, intent upon
producing a formal written record. To add to the difficulties of inter-
agency coordination, the infrastructure of courts in some countries is
simply not set up for holding public trials.
59
The formalistic approach, finally, fails to give a proper reading of the
rule of law and may in fact exacerbate its demise.
2. The Substantive Definition
The substantive definition focuses on results and concentrates on
"justice" or "fairness., 60 The substantive definition links the rule of law
with something "normatively good and desirable, 6 1 such as a set of
ideals, "whether understood in terms of protection of human rights,
specific forms of organized government, or particular economic
arrangements." 62 This concept measures the rule of law by how well the
system being considered resembles the initial goal and how well the
system's basic components function. For example, the substantive
59. See Christina Biebesheimer, Expectations and Reality in Rule of Law Reform in
Latin America (unpublished paper).
60. See Stephenson, supra note 48.
61. See id.
62. See Chesterman, supra note 36, at 340.
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approach examines whether the court system works efficiently, are
criminals convicted and held accountable, are mechanisms in place for
restitution, and do local communities have faith in the capacity of the
courts and the judges to enforce the rule of law?
63
But this approach has its shortcomings. Deciding how just and fair
a specific legal system is entails a very complex and subjective
analysis.64 Moreover, it seems that we should not be concerned with
whether a society possesses or lacks the "rule of law" when we are
determining whether the nation is just and good. This approach gives an
unfair, even contradictory and false reading of the rule of law in Latin
America. Is this approach judged according to what the civil society in a
nation thinks is "fair and just" for their way of living and goals? 65 Who
compares the society, a reformer or a citizen of that society? Or does
this method evaluate a nation's rule of law as it is compared to others,
and if compared to others, are the other societies similar to the one being
evaluated? Will concluding whether one country possesses the rule of
law depend on the organization or individual evaluating the nation? Or
will it depend on what the nation's citizens believe ought to be fair and
just?
If we adopt the substantive definition we run into the problem of the
"one-size-fits-all" approach to rule of law reform. In the name of
improving the rule of law, the countries in the region have embarked on
several institutional reforms. Some perceive such reforms in public
institutions as of "overwhelming importance of the institutional
framework to global competitiveness. '' 66 But, this strategy has created
frustrating results not only with the reforming institutions but in the
nations reformed. Judgment on a nation's rule of law cannot ignore the
opinion of the citizens affected by the systems. Likewise, reforms
cannot be imposed from outside a nation by individuals whose careers
depend on securing continuing contracts for rule of law reform projects
or who may have ulterior motives for promoting reforms.67
3. The Functional Definition
The functional definition of the rule of law explains how the rule of
law functions to serve a society and places the rule of law within the
63. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 70-72.
64. See Stephenson, supra note 48.
65. See id.
66. See Christopher Sabatini, In Today's Latin America, Competitiveness Requires
More Than Free Trade, VIEWPOINT AMERICAS, Apr. 2005, available at http://coa.council
oftheamericas.org/article.php?id=309.
67. See Thome, supra note 50, at 698 (describing World Bank's evolution
throughout its involvement in rule of law projects in the Americas).
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68context of supporting the foundations that fortify the civil society.
Central to this definition is the capacity of a nation's population to
sustain the institutions crucial to maintaining order and promoting
equality for all before the law, such as supporting and funding an
efficient judiciary, supporting law enforcement, and empowering local
authorities to feel that they have a critical stake in the sustainability of
the rule of law.69
In his cogent analysis of the functional definition, Matthew
Stephenson focuses on how well the law and legal system prevent
governmental indiscretion and arbitrary action and make the legal system
predictable.7 ° A great amount of government discretion in a society
equates to a nominal rule of law, while little discretion equals a greater
level of rule of law. This approach presents its own obstacles; it seems
to give legitimacy to actions performed in accordance with the law, even
if the effected individuals oppose those governmental actions.
Government discretion does not necessarily equate to a greater rule
of law.71 In Latin America, executive officials make many decisions
daily. Presidents often legislate by presidential decree and administrative
agencies issue thousands of regulations and codes. Outsiders tend to
evaluate the amount of presidential decrees as arbitrary governmental
actions while many nations construe such "prerogative" not only as
following the law but as being constrained by it. How then are we to
total the levels of discretion for individual types of decisions into an
overall measure of the rule of law?
Under the functional approach, in order to prevent governmental
abuse and arbitrary action and to make the legal system more predictable,
nations implementing reforms require a judicial institution that is strong,
independent, ethical, and effective.72 To achieve this goal, Stephenson
notes, there is a need for a judiciary that can balance the power of the
political branches while avoiding arbitrariness and tyranny.
Linn Hammergren has described judicial reforms already
implemented in the name of rule of law as slow, inherently unpredictable
and messy.
Anyone who thought they could design a comprehensive reform
program to be implemented in five years was not living in the real
world. However, excessive delays in some cases, massive
investments with minimal or the wrong results in others, and the
fewer instances of appreciable success do suggest that reforms must
68. See Chesterman, supra note 36, at 341.
69. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 60-61.





be more systematic as well as systemic in their focus, and that it may
be time for a third generation approach, one which is more selective
in what it attempts and how it attempts it, which prioritizes and
sequences types of change, and which more closely examines the
external and internal incentive systems it utilizes and attempts to
alter.
73
The reality of government in Latin America challenges the goals of
rule of law reform. Throughout the region, the executive branch still
exerts tremendous power over the other two branches, ruling by decree to
force its will on the judiciary and legislature, or undermining judicial
authority through political subterfuge and cronyism. There is little
accountability for the actions of civil servants and influential citizens.
Rules are made by members of the elite and upper-class with little or no
citizen participation. Equality under the law is just a statement on the
books that the powerful need not obey, giving truth to the Latin America
cliches, "made the law, made the trap," (hecha la ley hecha la trampa),
and "the deal for my friends, the law for my enemies" (la movida para
mis amigos, la ley para mis enemigos).
74
The reforms in place also call into question the approach taken
toward reforming the rule of law. Hammergren's brilliant analysis of
rule of law projects in Latin America details a laundry list of maladies:
Still the advances have been uneven, both within and across
countries. Some of the largest, most ambitious donor programs seem
to have produced the least measurable progress-USAID's program
in Colombia (supporting an extremely ambitious national
restructuring of the entire justice sector) or the World Bank's
Venezuelan project are arguably two examples, although in both
cases participants argue that it is too early to make this determination.
Even in countries which seem to have done more, observers have
questioned the quality or long term significance of their
accomplishments. The new programs, as designed and implemented,
often seemed driven by extraneous or counterproductive criteria,
sometimes openly contradicting the accumulated lessons of earlier
experience. More laws were rewritten, but attention to their intrinsic
quality or the conditions for their effective implementation continued
to receive short shrift. Monies were spent on infrastructure,
equipment, or massive training programs, but appointment systems
continued to be ruled by personal and partisan contacts; disciplinary
and evaluation systems are nonexistent or underutilized, backlogs
accumulate, and delays increase. Higher budgets, and greater judicial
73. See Hammergren, supra note 51, at 11.
74. See WILLIAM RATLIFF & EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA, JR., JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA: A FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (1995).
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control of administration and financial management have sometimes
produced still more opportunity for questionable use of resources,
while the introduction of judicial councils has often transferred
undesirable practices from the courts to the new entities. Efforts to
depoliticize the appointment of Supreme Courts have not produced
noticeably better candidates and have often meant a shift from one-
party control to multi-partisan colonization. More independent courts
or councils have sometimes escalated conflicts with other branches of
government leading some citizens and many politicians to question
the wisdom of their greater autonomy.
75
4. The Goal/Ends-based Definition
A goal-oriented "ends-based definition," 76 as defined by Rachel
Kleinfeld Belton, provides perhaps a better barometer to assess the level
to which a Latin American nation possesses the rule of law. This
definition specifies the goods that the rule of law provides to a society,
and includes goals that the rule of law seeks to achieve within a nation.
Under this definition, a society with the rule of law is one that illustrates
and exemplifies the following five achievements: "1) government bound
by the law; 2) equality before the law; 3) law and order; 4) predictable
and efficient rulings, and; 5) human rights. 7 7 When a nation determines
the goods and ends to include as part of the rule of law, then and only
then, can the nation organize, prioritize, and budget the "tools" that will
help to reach those goals. These tools, such as upholding law and order,
training the police, or providing predictable judicial proceedings are
"what most people mentally measure when determining the degree to
which a country has the rule of law."
78
The ends-based concept did not surface all at once, but developed
gradually over a period of time in response to different historical needs
representing distinct societal goals that are often in tension but advanced
together. 79 As Belton so aptly points out, "each end goal touches on
different cultural and political issues. Each is thus likely to meet
different pockets of resistance from different portions of society in
countries being reformed.
8 °
75. See Hammergren, supra note 51, at 11.
76. See Belton, supra note 4, at 6. According to Belton, there are two working
definitions for the rule of law: those that emphasize the ends that the rule of law is
intended to serve within society, and those that highlight the institutional attributes
believed necessary to actuate the rule of law. See id.
77. See id. at 3.
78. See id. at 6.




E. Problems with the Latin American Approach to the Rule of Law
The many problems confronting the region are of both external and
internal character. External problems arise when governments and
institutions attempting to induce Latin America to improve its rule of law
overlook and underestimate rule of law goals by overstressing
institutional reforms. Reforms are promoted by developed nations to
achieve Western-like institutions. However, in pushing Western ideals,
western governments ignore the difficulties and flaws contained within
their own political institutions, and may also unintentionally impose a
different set of expectations on the institutions undergoing reform.81
For example, judicial and criminal reforms agendas throughout
Latin America are modeled after the Anglo-American adversarial system
and discount entirely the social, cultural, and historical background of
Latin America's centuries-old continental legal traditions. Completely
discarding entire legal systems because they are considered by so-called
rule of law experts to be inferior to the common law milieu of the United
States presents a number of problems. It is presumptuous at the very
least and invites discontent, confusion and animosity toward reform
projects. It may also deter rule of law ends. Rather than helping to
improve the delivery of justice and reinforce the rule of law, this
approach, Beltran argues, borders on bullying by the United States
reformers and deters meaningful and enduring change.82 There is plenty
of documentation to advocate for a reform of the judicial institutions in
the Americas, but as Joseph Thome points out, "there are clear risks in
using models from the North to fix the legal 'insufficiencies' without due
regard to the particular needs and contexts of the Southern 'receiving'
societies. 83
Reformers give the impression that the modeled institutions are the
solution to every problem and present them as perfect and invulnerable.
Reform promoters seem not to accept that the very institutions upon
which reform regimes are modeled are themselves susceptible to
corruption, abuse, and political machinations, particularly within the
judicial process. Reform consultants coming to work in Latin America
from abroad often fail to acknowledge fallibility in the systems they are
transplanting, and they forget to communicate to reform recipients that
81. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 70-72.
82. See Belton, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that, depending on how legal reforms are
implemented, institutional reforms can undermine the rule of law).
83. See Thome, supra note 50, at 701.
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the institutions being modeled are also deficient and in a constant state of
evolution toward better goals themselves.
84
The developed nations, namely the United States, also overlook the
fact that their legal cultures are different from those of Latin America
and that such cultures have at times created their own cushion for when
their own institutions fail. 85 "Not only are innumerable institutions to be
reformed not necessarily essential to rule-of-law reform, but they can
even impede it, by insisting on a model that is either unnecessary or
unsuited to the political and cultural landscape.,
86
There are also many internal problems that impede meaningful
reform and reinforcement of the rule of law in Latin America. These
problems concern the failure of Latin America's leadership first to
consider the implications of rule of law initiatives from aiding nations
that affect the goals to be reached, and neglecting to properly and
pragmatically identifying the institutional, political, and cultural changes
truly necessary to best achieve those goals.
Leaders need to communicate with their own citizens-from all
sectors of the society-and make them participants (stakeholders) in the
reforms. 87 They need to connect the goals before changing institutions.
For example, to attack criminality in order to achieve law and order,
equality under the law, and human rights, several tools can be improved:
police reform and retraining, revising criminal codes by increasing
certain penalties, establishing procedures to facilitate just and fair trails
of suspected individuals, creating a court system with independent and
ethical judges, rules of procedure that will allow judges to hold trials that
are just, speedy, and fair, and establishing a judicial police force that is
well trained and tooled to investigate fairly, speedily, humanely, and
ethically every crime, including those committed by corrupt community
leaders and politicians.
84. See Mdximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure:
Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 617-19 (2007)
(characterizing the network of reformers as a "Southern activist expert network").
85. It is not easy to measure or define legal culture. Culture is a broad "catch-all
term for an array of complex beliefs, symbols, and patterns of behavior." Not even
anthropologists agree on a definition of culture. Cf World Bank-Topic Brief, Legal
Culture and Judicial Reform, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAW
JUSTINST/Resources/LegalCultureBrief.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
86.' See Belton, supra note 4, at 18.
87. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 79-80.
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III. Internal Armed Conflict, Terrorism, and Human Rights in Latin
America
A. The Big Picture and Latin America
The attacks of September 11, 2001, were the defining moment for
our new millennium; a brutal announcement to the world by fanatical
extremists that the assault upon civil societies by terrorist actors will
likely be among the most pressing issues confronting nations over at
least the next two decades.88 Whether we are now involved in a third
world war or only immersed in yet another cycle of a centuries-old
religious and cultural conflict, the challenge before policymakers,
military strategists, lawyers, judges, and law enforcement professionals
around the world, is how best to protect populations from terrorist attacks
while preserving the rule of law and respecting human rights.
How do we protect the rule of law and respect human rights while
combating those who give no value to human life and view their own
deaths as a victory? How do we hold preservation of the rule of law to
the highest of philosophical and moral standards while recognizing that
the fight against terrorists and illegal armed groups may at times require
measures that come dangerously close to stepping over the line of the
established norms of conduct memorialized in international agreements
and commitments between nations? How do we accomplish nation
building and achieving political and economic stability in places such as
Latin America where endemic social and political challenges and the
viscera of failing states contribute to and fuel the criminal activities of
illegal actors and allow human rights abuses to occur with impunity.
Terrorism takes many forms in Latin America. In recent decades
several illegal armed groups have emerged, such as Sindero Luminoso
and Tupac Amaru (MRTA) in Peru, Sandanistas in Nicaragua,
Tupamaros in Uruguay, Montoneros in Argentina, Zapatista rebels in the
southern Mexican state of Chiapas, and fight-wing paramilitary and left-
wing guerilla groups in Colombia,8 9 operating within and beyond their
national borders. Mixed into this witch's brew are sundry criminal
gangs, narcotraffickers, and transnational criminal organizations. In
some instances the active home grown terrorist groups are colluding with
88. See Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Armed Forces, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Lt. Gen. Patrick M.
Hughes, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), available at http://armed-services.
senate.gov/statenmt/1999/990202ph.pdf.
89. Colombian illegal armed groups include Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC), Ej~rcito Liberaci6n Nacional (ELN), Ej~rcito Popular de Liberaci6n
(EPL), and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).
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international terrorist organizations from Europe, the Middle East, and
Asia,90 who see fertile ground throughout Latin America for finding safe
haven, for conducting the types of illegal activities that fuel terrorist
movements (for example, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling,
trafficking in humans), and for establishing staging "bases" for launching
terrorist attacks against the United States and Canada, or other target-rich
Latin American states. 91
Fundamental to the challenges confronting nation states in the war
against terrorism and illegal armed groups is determining a definition of
terrorism that can pass universal scrutiny. While the meaning of the term
"terrorism" has evolved over the last two centuries, the global
community has yet to reach a consensus on a legal meaning.92 The word
has gone through various metamorphoses. It first appeared during the
French Revolution as a term with a positive connotation used to describe
a government for establishing order and consolidating democracy. 93 It
later became a term "with overt criminal implications," and was
associated with an abuse of power.94 Still later "terrorism" described the
usage of acts of violence to attract attention to a group and its cause,
95
90. See, e.g., The Americas Foundation, Iranian Investment in Colombia Raises
Suspicion, http://www.theamericas.org/colombia.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
91. For example, fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organizations were behind the
attacks against the Jewish community in Argentina several years ago, and were able to do
so via a sophisticated terrorist network established in the border regions of Brazil,
Uruguay, and Argentina, known as the Iguaqu Triangle. Cf. REX HUDSON, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, TERRORIST AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA)
OF SOUTH AMERICA (2003), available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/
TerrOrgCrimeTBA.pdf.
92. Defining terrorism "has haunted the debate among States for decades." United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Definitions of Terrorism, http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/terrorismdefinitions.html (last visited July 28, 2003). "There is no universally
accepted definition of international terrorism." RAPHAEL PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND US FOREIGN POLICY 7 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB95112.pdf.
93. Cf BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 15-16 (1998) (discussing the origins of
the word "terrorism").
94. See id. at 16-17.
95. This meaning is based on the principle of "propaganda by deed" inspired by
Carlo Pisacane, an Italian republican extremists. See id. 17-18. According to Pisacane,
"ideas result from deeds" and violence was necessary to draw attention and "to educate
and rally the masses behind the revolution." Id. To challenge the tsarist's rule, a group
of Russian constitutionalists, the Narodnaya Volya, used Pisacane's principle. They
chose their victims for a symbolic value. They targeted a selective group of civilians
considered "the embodiment of the autocratic, oppressive state." Id. The group aborted
missions to kill intended victims' when the family was around. Id.
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and most recently to denote acts of violence motivated by a particular
belief system (ideological and/or religious).96
In the absence of a universally recognized consensus defining
terrorism, the nation states of Latin America at war with illegal armed
groups and terrorism on their own soil have to overcome credibility
issues with regard to the preservation of human rights, and to holding
accountable those within the government chain of command who violate
such rights. But determining where the line is drawn, without a baseline
definition, invites emotional subjectivity.
The United Nations and other international extra-political
organizations, in their roles as facilitators of the norms of universal
conduct and accountability, have articulated a definition of terrorism as
an attack against human rights. At the United Nations, former Secretary
General Kofi Anan emphasized that failing to attend to the "observance
of human rights standards ... would be self-defeating."97  The
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), in a 2004 position statement
presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights,98 urged that fighting
against terrorism must not "undermine the human rights law that member
states have themselves painstakingly built up over fifty years."99 The ICJ
identified the following specific protections as having already been
violated in the war against terrorism:
" freedom from torture;
* the right to life;
* freedom from arbitrary detention;
* the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law;
* freedoms of association and expression;
" the right to asylum;
" the right to non-discrimination. 00
Failure of the institutions by which we define our civil societies to
preserve these and other human rights norms will reduce a government's
96. For an excellent book with a multidisciplinary approach to understanding
terrorists' motivations, see WALTER REICH, ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGIES,
IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATE OF MIND (1998).
97. Leslie Palti, Combating Terrorism while Protecting Human Rights, U.N. CHRON.
ONLINE EDITION, Dec. 1, 2004, available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/
issue4/0404p27.html.
98. The Human Rights Council succeeded the Commission. See G.A. Res. 60/25 1,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
99. See Statement by the Int'l Comm'n of Jurists to the United Nations Comm'n on
Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
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ability to retain the high moral ground in the fight against terrorists and
result eventually in victory for those who seek to destroy the
fundamental human rights that underpin the foundations of modem life.
Failure to preserve the integrity of any of these protections degrades the
rule of law and undermines the civil society.
There is a bumper sticker making its rounds around the United
States that reads, "We are making enemies faster than we can kill them."
There is a terrible irony in that dark humor. We are confronting
international terrorists and illegal armed groups who are fanatically
committed to seeing the United States and its allies weakened or
destroyed.' 0 ' On a regional scale, we must contend with "local" criminal
organizations and illegal armed groups and the criminal activities that
sustain them.'12 These groups have many characteristics and vary in
scale, but are just as pernicious and deadly to a regional or national
population as are terrorist groups operating globally. 0 3  Yet, in our
rightful zeal to combat terrorists who follow no rules of conduct, who
sneer at accepted laws of war and international humanitarian law, and
who have no regard whatsoever for human rights, we seem to take two
steps backward for each step we take forward when implementing our
counter-terrorism policies and tactics. 104 Even though we are fighting
terrorists who use children and women as human shields'0 5 and who store
weapons and hide in civilian abodes and places of worship,' 0 6 the United
101. See generally Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead, supra note
87.
102. See Carlos Escude, From Captive to Failed State: Argentina Under Systemic
Populism, 1975-2006, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2006, 125; Carrielyn Donigan
Guymon, International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organized
Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 53 (2000);
Edward Kleemans, Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering, 35 CRIME &
JUST. 163 (2007).
103. See Garry Leech, Bush Administration Fails to Acknowledge Existence of
Paramilitary Groups in Columbia, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.colombiajoumal.org/
colombia279.htm (last visited May 17, 2008); Press Packet, United Nations World
Summit, Securing a Dangerous World (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.un.org/
summit2005/presskit/Peace.pdf
104. See Amos N. Guiora, Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism, a Global
Perspective, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 125 (2005); Christian Halliburton, Letting Katz Out
of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom and Fourth Amendment Fidelity, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 309
(2007); see also Gerald P. Fogarty, Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on
Terror?, 35 PARAMETERS 54, 62 (2005), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/
usawc/Parameters/05autumn/fogarty.pdf.
105. See Terrorists Use Children As Shields; Child Dies in Firefight, CONG. Q. REG.
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, Sept. 21, 2005; Algerian Army Close to Assault Group of 50
'Terrorists' in Jijel, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, May 3, 2006.
106. See Neville Dean & Nick Allen, Terrorist Weapons Seized in Mosque Raid,




States and its allies are vilified by critics and by governments
antagonistic to the United States and its influence in the international
arena and accused of violating human rights if military efforts to
prosecute military operations do not result in pinpoint accuracy against
terrorist targets. 
107
B. Toward an International Standard of Conduct
In late 2003, twelve influential non-government organizations
10 8
issued the Joint Declaration on the Need for an International Mechanism
to Monitor Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism.'0 9 The declaration
expressed profound concern that "-human rights and fundamental
freedoms have been or may be undermined by certain counter-terrorism
measures adopted or contemplated"' l10 by nations involved in the
international war against terrorists. The declaration sited specific
violations of human rights in the name of fighting terrorism, including:
* the practices of administrative detention without judicial
review;
" prolonged incommunicado detention;
* transfer, return, extradition, denial of entry, or expulsion of
persons at risk of being subjected to torture in contravention
of the principle of nonrefoulement or asylum;
* the adoption of loose definitions of 'terrorism' or 'terrorist
organizations', capable of resulting in breaches of the
principle of legality and allowing for the criminalization of
legitimate acts in exercise of fundamental freedoms;
* the removal of basic safeguards to prevent torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and
violations of the right to life;
107. See Uri Dan, Airstrike Dilemma, N.Y. POST, June 23, 2005, at 20; Uri Dromi,
Singling Out the Terrorists from Innocent People Is Not a Simple Task, MIAMI HERALD,
June 23, 2006, at 29.
108. The organizations represented were: The Coalition of International Non-
Governmental Organizations against Torture (CINAT); Amnesty International;
Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT); International Federation of Action by
Christians for the Abolition of Torture (FIACAT); International Commission of Jurists;
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT); Redress: Seeking
Reparation for Torture Survivors; World Organization against Torture (OMCT);
F~d~ration Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH); Human Rights
Watch; International Service for Human Rights; Friends World Committee for
Consultation (Quakers).
109. A copy of the document is available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
jointdeclarationl2l la.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2008).
110. Joint Declaration on the Need for an International Mechanism to Monitor
Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, at 3, available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/
pdf/jointdeclarationl21 la.pdf.
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* the adoption of measures which curtail the right to fair trial,
freedom of association, basic labor rights, the right to
asylum and the principle of non-discrimination. 111
Since its publication, at least seventy-eight non-government
organizations have endorsed the Declaration, a fact in itself that validates
the universal concern over how nations choose to prosecute war against
terrorism and illegal armed groups.
1. Antecedents to Latin American Conflict
The tension between confronting terrorism while preserving the rule
of law and respecting the rights of the Latin America's civil society is
not a phenomenon unique to Latin America. This phenomenon can be
traced back to several conflicts in the last century. For example, the
sectarian violence in Northern Ireland between the Irish Republican
Army and Irish Protestant and British constabulary and military forces
offers key insights into the issues before us.' 12 That long-running armed
conflict grew from British and Irish Protestant resistance to the
aspirations of Northern Irish Catholic nationalist communities to be
annexed by the Irish Republic after enduring decades of
disenfranchisement and discrimination at the hands of the British-backed
Irish Protestant elite.113 The conflict degenerated into a protracted and
extremely brutal internal armed conflict pitting Catholic guerrilla groups
operating under the umbrella of the Irish Republican Army against
Protestant paramilitary forces organized and supported covertly by the
British military and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. During the
particularly bloody period of 1966 to 2001, thousands of people were
killed by Republican and Loyalist groups in a series of terrorist acts and
political killings followed by retaliatory acts of equal or greater
violence.1 14  Many of the tools and techniques employed by today's
111. Id.
112. The Northern Irish conflict arose following the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, when
a guerrilla conflict commenced two years earlier by nationalists in the south resulted in
the partition of Ireland into the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland, which remained a
self-governing part of the United Kingdom. See Northern Ireland (Huridocs Code: 8239),
available at http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/humanrts/emergency/nirelandl/INTRO.HTM#
human.
113. The provisional IRA identified closely with the Irish Republican Army, which
conducted a guerrilla war in Northern Ireland in the 1920s in an effort to unite the entire
Irish territories into a single independent republic.
114. "From the late 1960s through the 1990s, over 3,700 individuals died as the result
of political violence in Northern Ireland-a figure that would translate into roughly
500,000 deaths had a conflict of similar scale occurred in the U.S. Parties to this conflict
included both non-state and state actors: the IRA and smaller armed Republican groups;
[Vol. 27:1
ON ARMED CONFLICT
terrorists and illegal armed groups were honed in the streets of Belfast,
Ulster and Londonderry throughout the last century; indeed, some IRA
members later became mercenaries for hire to train illegal armed actors
and foment internal armed conflict and narcoterrorism in Latin
America.'
1 15
Throughout the Northern Irish conflict, particular concern persisted
over the following specific violations of human rights, most often
perpetrated against the Catholic communities:
(a) Lethal Force: alleged operation of shoot-to-kill policies by
security forces throughout the emergency but principally in 1978-79,
1982 and from 1987 onwards; alleged manipulation of coroners
inquests to prevent full evidence of incidents being produced;
(b) Torture: alleged use of torture and/or inhuman or degrading
treatment on persons held for interrogation in 1971-72; alleged
systematic beating of persons held for interrogation in 1976-78;
alleged inhuman treatment of prisoners during protests over political
status in 1978-81;
(c) Detention: alleged unjustified and discriminatory use of detention
powers in 1969 and from 1971 to 1975;
(d) Arrest: alleged use of emergency arrest and search powers to
harass members of the Catholic community throughout emergency;
(e) Trial: alleged use of special 'Diplock' courts to secure unjustified
convictions, many based on involuntary or fabricated confessions,
since 1972; alleged manipulation of evidence given by informers
from paramilitary groups in 'supergrass trials' between 1983-85.
116
The results of decades of adjudication involving human rights
abuses in the Northern Irish and United Kingdom courts indicate a
schizophrenic response by the courts of justice in grappling with the
rights of a sovereign state to combat terrorism and the rights of citizens
living within that state to be protected from state excesses. Among the
conflicting decisions rendered over the years:'
1 7
Loyalist paramilitaries, most notably the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF); the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the province's largely
Protestant police force; and the British Army and secret service." Christopher Connolly,
Living on the Past: The Role Of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies and the
Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 401,413 (2006).
115. See Luz E. Nagle, Global Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia's Legal
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1922-refusal by court to inquire into reasons for administrative
detention in habeas corpus proceedings;
118
1972-Army must inform suspect of broad legal basis for arrest;
119
1984-Suspicion of involvement in specific terrorist incidents not
120required under emergency arrest power;
1988-Assault leading to injury during detention may render the
detention unlawful; 1
21
1981-Refusal of prison authorities to accept claims to special status
for terrorist offenders not in breach of European Convention on
Human Rights;
122
1987-Arrest for questioning for more than four days without
judicial authorization in breach of the European Convention on
Human Rights.1
23
1988-Assault leading to injury during detention may render the
detention unlawful.1
24
The "Troubles," as the Northern Ireland conflict has come to be known,
provides a cautionary tale for Latin American states struggling with
internal armed conflict and terrorism in that the imposition of military
rule in order to contend with conflict led to abuse of the basic human
rights of civilians without justification. 125 From its inception in 1922, the
Royal Ulster Constabulary recruited a far greater number of
118. R (O'Hanlon) v. Governor of Belfast Prison. (1922) 56 Ir. L.T.R. 1.
119. McElduff, Re., (1972) N. Ir. 1, available at 1972 WL 37585.
120. McKee v. Chief Constable for Northern Ireland, (1984) 1 W.L.R. 1358.
121. Re (on the application of Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
[2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 307 (U.K.), available at 2006 WL 502934.
122. McFeeley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8317/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161 (1981).
123. Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 11. Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988).
124. Gillan, [2006] UKHL 12.
125. The Northern Ireland conflict has also raised probing questions about protecting
the human rights of children caught between terrorist groups and government forces. A
1992 Human Rights Watch report on children being abused by combatants in Northern
Ireland presented several issues that transcend the specific conflict and can be found in
other counter-terrorism campaigns, including abuse of children repeatedly detained and
abused while held in custody by government forces, harassment of children on the streets
by both government forces and terrorist groups, and children falling victim to punishment
and retaliatory violence by armed terrorist groups. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,




Protestants, 126 which undermined the Constabulary's credibility among
the Catholic community and created conditions for Constabulary
members to establish covert ties to Protestant militant groups.
We can see similar traits emerge among military and national police
forces throughout Latin America, particularly in Colombia, where covert
ties to paramilitary armed groups operate with direct and indirect
command, control, and material support from government forces and
corrupt politicians, and weaken confidence among the civilian
populations toward their governments.127 In addition, whereas the court
system could have been the arbiter in Northern Ireland holding
accountable those individuals responsible for human rights violations
against the population, the courts, judges, and prosecutors instead were
intimidated and victimized by those individuals and groups opposed to
the rule of law. 12
8
The issues involving the fight against terrorism and illegal armed
groups and preserving human rights as identified in the Northern Ireland
conflict parallel other conflicts involving terrorist groups worldwide and
collectively show us that the international community has been ill-
equipped to intercede, let alone stop, terrorism. This emerged in the
early years of the United Nations when its actions to broker the creation
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine exacerbated indiscriminate attacks by
Zionist terrorist organizations such as Irgun Zvai Leumi (also known as
ETZEL) against Arab and British government targets. 129 The inability
and incompetence of the United Nations to respond at the beginning of
the Middle East conflict set in motion decades of retaliatory strikes and
126. See Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
northemireland/schools/agreementpolicing/commissionl.shtml (last visited July 22,
2008) (reporting that "although Catholics represent more than 40% of the Northern
Ireland population they comprise only 7% of RUC membership").
127. See UNHCR, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
COLOMBIAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES (2006), available at www.unhcr.org/
refworld/pdfid/422c832e4.pdf (noting that a 2004 UN Human Rights Committee finding
indicated close ties between Colombian security forces and paramilitary combatants and
a climate "of tolerance and complicity of State agents in extra-judicial executions and
enforced disappearances").
128. The killing in Northern Ireland of Lord Justice Gibson, as an example, targeted
the preservation of justice and "was a blow against much that decent people cherish: the
rule of law, and a forum for the resolution of disputes which operates on the basis of law,
fairness and impartiality. It was a murder that encouraged chaos and a complete
breakdown of society." See JUSTICE PETER CORY, CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT-
LORD JUSTICE GIBSON AND LADY GIBSON 8 (2003), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
issues/collusion/cory/cory03gibson.pdf.
129. See American Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Irgun Zeva'I Le'umi, "The
National Military Organization" (Etzel, I.Z.L.), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/
jsource/History/irgun.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
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the rise of the international Islamic terrorist organizations now
threatening the security of nations and regions worldwide.
2. State Terrorism and Human Rights in Latin America: The
Case of Pinochet
In Latin America, opposition to perceived threats to the rule of law
combined with the fear among traditional ruling elites over losing their
power and privilege have manifested in horrific periods of political
violence and human rights abuses carried out by the state against
perceived subversives. Nowhere in Latin America was this conflict
between preserving the status quo and resisting pressure by leftist
movements more volatile than in Chile in the 1970s, when a progressive
socialist, Salvador Allende, rose to the presidency on a popular mandate,
only to be violently overthrown and assassinated by a brutal military
oligarchy led by General Augusto Pinochet? 
30
The human rights atrocities committed by General Pinochet over the
course of his 26-year dictatorship stemmed from his prominent role in
Operation Condor, a plan developed among seven Latin American
dictators in the early 1970s to suppress opposition movements and
eliminate individual dissidents by sending teams of hit men and
interrogators across national borders to track down, torture, and often kill
their targets. The success of this cooperative covert operation was
premised on the notion that dissidents living in other countries could be
kept under surveillance without their knowledge and would be unable
later to identify their captors or interrogators. 131 One could reasonably
argue that Operation Condor was an act of state sponsored terrorism
against dissidents and a callous violation of human rights, foreign
sovereignty, and the rule of law. Yet, it was not until 1992 that a judge
in Paraguay brought the nature of Operation Condor to broad public light
when he stumbled across the "so-called Terror Files, giving names and
details of thousands of victims of South American military regimes.' 132
Among the most notorious of murders carried out under Operation
Condor was the 1976 assassination by car bombing in Washington, D.C.,
of Orlando Letelier del Solar, a political analyst and former Ambassador
to the United States under President Salvadore Allende.133 The attack
130. For a definitive treatise on the Pinochet dictatorship, see CARLOS HUNEEUS, THE
PINOCHET REGIME (Lake Sagaris trans., 2006).
131. Phil Davison, Will Pinochet Be Brought to Justice in His Native Chile?, BELFAST
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 6, 2005.
132. Id.
133. See Christopher Marquis & Diana Jean Schemo, Documents Shed Light on
Assassination of Chilean in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at A14.
[Vol. 27:1
ON ARMED CONFLICT
took the lives of Letelier and his American assistant, Ronnie Moffit, and
severely wounded Moffit's husband.1
34
While undergoing medical treatment in England in October 1998,
Pinochet was placed under house arrest 135 after Spanish judge Baltasar
Garz6n Real indicted Pinochet and requested his extradition to stand trial
for torture, genocide, and terrorism against Spanish nationals in Chile.
136
The former dictator then claimed sovereign immunity as a defense that as
a former head of state, his actions while in power were above the law,
and therefore, he could not be tried on such charges. 137  He then
embarked on a cynical and often overtly melodramatic campaign to show
that he was too infirm and feeble to be sent to Spain, and after some
seventeen months of political maneuvering, legal acrobatics and
exceptional prowess, Pinochet was released from British detention and
returned to Chile. One might note that the bounce in his step and his
alert and smiling demeanor as he stepped off the plane in Chile was in
stark-or miraculous-contrast to his pallor and disoriented proclivities
while a guest of the British government.
The lesson to be considered with regard to Pinochet's methods of
resisting international accountability for crimes against humanity is
whether the international community has the resolve to strip "immunity
from government leaders suspected of committing war crimes and crimes
in violation of human rights laws."'' 38 Then, once steps are taken to hold
state actors accountable, the challenge becomes whether justice can be
achieved more quickly and "justly" in an international criminal tribunal
than in a domestic court of justice.
Notwithstanding what was by any standard of justice a bold and
noble attempt by Judge Garz6n to try Pinochet in Spain, consider for a
moment that if Pinochet were to have been extradited to face charges
134. See id.; Larry Rohter, Chile Seeks U.S. Files on 1976 Assassination, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2006, at A6.
135. Alex Perry, Pinochet Under House Armed Arrest for "Genocide" in Chile,
AGENCE PRESSE FRANCE, Oct. 18, 1998.
136. See Juzgado Central de Instruccion No. 5 de la Audiencia Nacional, Dec. 10,
1998 (Procedimiento Sumario No. 19/97), available at www.fasic.org/doc/auto.pdf.
137. See generally Frances Webber, The Pinochet Case: The Struggle for the
Realization of Human Rights, 26 J.L. Soc'y 523 (1999). While held in custody in
London, the English House of Lords rejected Pinochet's claim of head of state immunity
and determined that immunity only applies for functions performed in an official
capacity. See Brandon Mark, Acknowledging our Criminals: Henry Kissinger and East
Timor, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (2003); Claudia Martin, Catching up with the
Past: Recent Decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Addressing Gross
Human Rights Violations Perpetrated During the 1970's-1980's, 7 HuM. RTS. L. REV.
774, 778 (2007); Robert C. Power, Pinochet and the Uncertain Globalization of Criminal
Law, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 89, 106-44 (2007).
138. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
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there, what Pandora's Box would this open for the diplomatic status of
government officials traveling abroad? Could Henry Kissinger be
detained during a trip to Belgium to face charges in Indochina for crimes
against humanity? Could Donald Rumsfeld be arrested in France and
sent to Syria to face a domestic court there on charges of international
torture? Could Bill Clinton be detained on a trip to Argentina and sent
off to Somalia to face charges of aiding and abetting in fratricide?
Assuming that a current or former head of state was detained and sent to
another nation to stand trial and was convicted, what would prevent the
head of that nation's state to grant an immediate amnesty? Would not
such a situation amount to nothing more than a pyrrhic victory?
Despite Judge Garz6n's resolve in Spain to hold Pinochet
accountable when not even the Chilean courts were able to do so before
Pinochet died in December 2006, one could argue that despite the best of
intentions, universal crimes are best tried in the domestic courts of the
state or states in which the perpetrator and his or her crimes are most
associated, or in the international criminal tribunals if the domestic state
is not capable of carrying out a judicial proceeding.
Three goals, then, emerge for nation states to preserve the rule of
law by holding accountable those who commit terrorist acts and
violations of human rights. First, removing immunity from government
leaders responsible for perpetrating violations of human rights; second,
combating organized criminal activities that fund illegal armed groups,
terrorist acts, and sustain corrupt political regimes, and, third,
strengthening the capacity of judiciaries to bring terrorists and human
rights abusers to justice.1
39
C. A Plan ofAction for Fighting Illegal Armed Groups and Terrorist
Actors
In the course of defending the rule of law, Latin American nations
confronting illegal armed groups and their terrorist acts within their own
borders face a difficult challenge in balancing respect for human rights
while conducting security operations. Nation states confronting terrorist
threats are inherently constrained by several fundamental tenets that
define a nation's legitimacy under the rule of law, 140 in particular, that
decisions made by the state in a war against terrorism and internal armed
conflict must be made in the public interest, must be made objectively on
139. See id.
140. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., The Rule of Law, Human Rights and
Proportionality As Components of the War Against Terrorism: Is the US. Judiciary in
Self-Imposed Exile?, 7 J. MONEY LAUNDERING 218 (2004),
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the basis of shared values, must be fair, and that the actions ultimately
taken by the state must not be deemed cruel, unusual, or excessive.
41
Adhering to and honoring these and other basic norms of a civil
society are put to the test in this new Age of Terrorism. No legitimate
fighting force relishes pursuing terrorists who use innocent civilians as
shields as a means to prosecute terrorist goals. The seizure of innocent
school children by Chechen terrorists in the Russian city of Beslan in
September 2004 and the botched rescue attempt by government forces
that left hundreds of hostages dead, graphically demonstrated on
television screens around the world the difficulty in protecting innocent
civilians from the predations of fanatics willing to kill.142 Certainly, the
human rights of the victims caught in the Beslan catastrophe were
ignored by the terrorists who put them in such dire peril, and the
government forces that resorted to extreme measures to end the crisis
seem to have been no more mindful of such concerns for human life.
143
Regardless of the root causes or motivations behind the Beslan massacre,
the result of the tragedy left even some hard liners in the war against
terrorism wondering if the ends sought by the government to stop
terrorists justified the means.
There are and will continue to be times when security forces are
compelled to undertake operations that will be condemned for resulting
in human rights violations by individuals or groups seeking to capitalize
on a legitimate government's actions in order to sway public opinion or
inflame emotions. But nation states involved in the fight against
terrorism and illegal armed groups must adhere to the primacy of the rule
of law and respect for human rights over military and security objectives.
The United States military has devoted significant study to
achieving a balance between prosecuting military operations against
terrorists and illegal armed groups and respecting human rights and
preserving the rule of law. The several key factors that have emerged
from the US analysis have direct application for Latin American nation
states struggling to fortify the rule of law, achieve socio-political
stability, and respond to violations of human rights. These include:
141. Cf LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1977).
142. See Seth Mydans, Russia Grieves for Children and Putin Vents His Fury, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at A1O.
143. See, e.g., Michael Ross Fowler, The Relevance of Principled Negotiation to
Hostage Crises, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 251 (2007); Lawrence Uzzell, Officials Evade
Responsibility as Death Toll Remains in Doubt, N. CAUCUSES WKLY., Oct. 6, 2004,
http://www.jamestown.org/publicationsdetails.php?volumeid=396&issueid=3104&art
icle_id=2368670; Fred Weir, Russian Forces Faulted in Beslan School Tragedy,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 1, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/
090l/p0 7s0l-woeu.html.
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Recognition that preserving human rights is central to achieving
any success in combating terrorism and illegal armed groups. "We
must move away from the rhetoric of human rights to the
implementation of human rights. Without human rights as an integral
part of any transition plan in a post conflict stage we are failing to
establish sound government."
' 144
A strategy for communication and consultation with
"stakeholders," those at the regional and local level who represent
pillars of a civil society-lawyers, jurists, doctors, or other key actors
such as community and faith based leaders. "These Communications
must be meaningful, genuine and occur before the implementation of
the reform measures; not after."'
' 45
Balancing expectations between military/security forces and the
stakeholders. There must be realistic expectations about what can be
accomplished within a reasonable time frame.
Strengthening communications between military/security forces
and human rights organizations operating in zone of internal conflict
or in the aftermath of terrorist acts. While the United States military
believes that relations with humanitarian organizations are strong,
effort must be undertaken to build partnerships with human rights
organizations. "It is critical for the military to be able to identify and
inform the respective human rights organizations when there are
violations of human rights. The military must be able to assist in
being an active player in advancing human rights and rule of law."
1 46
Improve coordination among all actors involved in legal reform
efforts. The military must expand that effort to all "actors" such as
policy makers, civil society, etc."
' 14 7
Establish, fortify, or reform a national constitution and other
legal instruments critical to nation building and preserving
human rights. Legal reforms and law making "must be viewed by
all as legitimate, realistic and genuine, both by the international
community and the public at large. Without these key components, a
legitimate process will not exist. %







Establish Human Rights Institutions within governments that are
funded and capable of carrying out effective investigations and
bringing human rights violators to justice. 
149
IV. The Rule of Law and International Organizations in Latin America
The international community and global organizations have long
played a role in charting the course of modem nation building and
establishing the rule of law in Latin America. The Inter-American
Development Bank, chartered in 1959, articulates four primary strategies
that go to the core of preserving the rule of law against illegal armed
actors and human rights violations:
* Social development, particularly poverty reduction through
sustainable economic development, educational reforms,
and initiatives that promote social inclusion.
" Competitiveness, particularly supporting activities that
improve countries' ability to compete in the global
economy as well as strengthen their financial sectors and
capital markets.
* Regional integration, including integration at the sub-
regional, regional and hemispheric levels.
* Modernization of the state activities, including the
processes of state reform and institutional strengthening at
the national and sub-national levels.
150
The United States has promoted nation building in Latin America
through a host of international government entities such as the United
States Agency for International Development, the Department of
Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
program, and various military training agreements through the
Department of Defense. At the core of national building efforts are the
priorities of security for economic development and investment, the
proliferation of democracy in the region, and protection of fundamental
human rights. However, it is to the United Nations and the Organization
of American States that Latin American nations have turned for
establishing and preserving the rule of law and protecting human rights
in the region.
149. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 70-72.
150. Inter-American Development Bank, Institutional Strategy-IDB, http://
www.iadb.org/aboutus/I/ma-institutional.cftn?language=English (last visited Aug. 3,
2008).
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A. The Role of the United Nations
The United Nations has long been at the forefront of articulating,
affirming, and supporting the resolve of member states to respect human
rights and to preserve the rule of law. In fact, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights ("UDHR"), drafted by the United Nations in 1948, was
among the young organization's first order of business.151 The UDHR
stated in the most unambiguous and unequivocal terms that it is essential
that "human rights should be protected by the rule of law," and that
"recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world."'1 52
Unfortunately, the aspirations of the United Nations have not
always coincided with reality. According to the International
Commission of Jurists, the United Nations record in protecting human
rights in the course of "refereeing" the campaigns against terrorists has
been woefully inadequate, and that the then United Nations Commission
on Human Rights failed in the aftermath of September 11 "to establish
even a modest mechanism to monitor the performance of states."1 53 The
ICJ pointed to the fundamental problem of guaranteeing respect for
human rights in the war against terrorists, that "[t]he existing UN human
rights system is simply not adequate" to "assess the compatibility of
national counter-terrorism measures with international human rights
obligations., 154 The ICJ also stressed that the fundamental problem of
tracking states' obligations is that human rights treaties are not
universally ratified and the Human Rights Committee which has
oversight of individual country reports is limited in the number of reports
it can examine in a year's time. It seems profoundly disconcerting that
the inability of the United Nations to fulfill its obligations to member
states is due to internal administrative shortcomings. But, if not the
United Nations as the international organization most responsible for
urging respect for human rights upon its member states in Latin America,
then who else will be capable of bringing sustained pressure on these
nations to ensure that human rights are protected in what has become a
protracted war against terrorists around the world?
The United Nations, in its role as a facilitator of the norms of
universal conduct and accountability, relies upon legal mechanisms
developed through consensus that articulate and inform a universally
151. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 271A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
152. Id. at pmbl.




acceptable embodiment of the rule of law. The authority carried by the
United Nations to interpret and defend the rule of law, however, is
dependent upon constant recognition that its members states enjoy equal
sovereignty and standing before the world body, even if in reality such is
not always the case.
155
Simon Chesterman raises the view of some that "it is questionable
whether the United Nations may properly be said to embody the rule of
law in a meaningful way, in large part due to the peace and security
powers given to or asserted by its Security Council" and other security
arrangements available under the terms of the United Nations Charter.
156
Rather, the United Nations and other international deliberative bodies in
the world may reflect the concept of a universal or international rule of
law from which the standards and ambitions of individual nations may be
drawn. In the case of protection of human rights at the regional or
national level, a rule of international law would assert "primacy of
human rights covenants over domestic legal arrangements,"' 57 and
provide a model for nation states to determine how the rule of law is used
rather than what the rule of law means. 158 In other words, the concept of
government of laws would demand moral and non-discriminatory
accountability, and that such recognition would compel a nation state to
protect human rights in the course of bringing terrorists and illegal actors
before the law.
The International Commission of Jurists ("ICJ"), in a 2004 position
statement presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights, 59 urged
that fighting against terrorism and by extension, illegal armed groups,
must not "undermine the human rights law that member states have
themselves painstakingly built up over fifty years.' 160 The ICJ identified
the following specific protections as having already been violated in the
war against terrorism:
* freedom from torture;
* the right to life;
* freedom from arbitrary detention;
155. See Chesterman, supra note 36, at 354 (noting that the structure of the Security
Council of the United Nations, for example, is such that some nations are more equal
than others).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 355.
158. Seeid. at 359.
159. On March 15, 2006, the Human Rights Council replaced the Commission. See
G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006). The Commission's last
session took place on March 27, 2006. See CHR-62nd Session, Geneva 2006,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/index.htm (last visited July 15, 2008).
160. See ICJ Statement, supra note 99.
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* the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law;
* freedoms of association and expression;
* the right to asylum;
* the right to non-discrimination.'
6'
Failure of the institutions by which we define our civil societies to
preserve these and other human rights norms will reduce a government's
ability to retain the high moral ground in the fight against terrorists and
result eventually in victory for those who seek to destroy the
fundamental human rights underpin the foundations of modem life.
B. The Role of the Organization of American States
In 2001, several foreign ministers of states belonging to the
Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, 62 which greatly expanded the concept of democracy to include
all the aspects of human dignity, the right to constitutional guarantees
according the citizens of members nations, and the hope that Latin
American states could move toward greater implementation of
democratic protections for all members of society. 163 The 9-11 attacks in
the United States challenge directly the democratic aspirations and goals
set forth by the Charter.
In June 2005, the OAS General Assembly adopted the Declaration
of Florida ("Declaration"), entitled "Delivering the Benefits of
Democracy,"' 164 in which member states pledged to advance the
hemisphere's democratic values and democratic institutions. The
signatories of the Declaration declared that "elimination of extreme
poverty is essential to the promotion and consolidation of democracy,"
and that to reach such a goal, governments will need to create "decent"
and lucrative employment.' 65 Further, the ministers stressed "that for
democracy to prosper governments must be responsive to the legitimate
aspirations of their people, and must work to provide their people with
the tools and opportunities to improve their lives."' 166 In accordance with
the Declaration, people have a right to democracy, governments have a
161. Id.
162. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11,
2001, available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic-
Charter.htm.
163. Id.
164. Organization of American States, Declaration of Florida, AG/DEC. 41 (XXXV-





duty to "promote and defend it," and governments "must be answerable
to their peoples., 167  The Declaration states the manner in which
countries ought to be democratically governed: "with full respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, the separation
of powers and independence of the judiciary, and democratic
institutions.' 68
The Declaration underscores the daunting challenge confronting
Latin American states as they seek to preserve the rule of law while
achieving regional security objectives against illegal armed groups and
terrorist organizations working within the region. Ongoing political
unrest and protest suggest that the democratic governments throughout
the region are ineffective, weak, threatened, or have failed completely.
69
Leaders need to instill in their constituencies the sense that democracy is
not just a government task but a nation's duty and dependent upon the
efforts of each individual citizen. It is a goal to be aspired to by all, and
one for which everyone must persevere and work hard to achieve on
one's own in the course of one's daily routine. Democracy does not
transpire overnight with the implementation of new legislation, but rather
emerges, remains and continues through modification, change, and
evolution of individual behaviors and cultural orientation.
Fulfilling commitments under the Declaration seems unreachable
when the region is awash with several forms of smuggling (trafficking in
drugs, weapons, documents, and humans), the escalating violence and
destabilization associated with such activities, and increasing gang-
related violence in areas where government law enforcement is
ineffective. 170 Also, corruption remains a weakening influence in both
the private and public sectors,' 7' contributes significantly to economic
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Symposium, Challenges to Fragile Democracies in the Americas:
Legitimacy and Accountability, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 319 (2001); Steven R. Ratner, New
Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry on International Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707 (1999).
170. For several decades, Colombia has languished under drug-related violence and
insurgency by non-state actors. In Central America and Mexico, gang violence presents a
growing threat to an already tenuous stability in the region. See Press Release, Org. Am.
States, Gangs Pose a Serious Threat to Hemisphere, El Salvador Official Tells OAS
(Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/pressreleases/
press-release.asp?sCodigo=E-274/05.
171. Corruption continues to be a major problem in the hemisphere. According to
Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, Haiti has the highest
corruption in Latin America while Chile has the least corruption. See Transparency
International, CPI 2005, http://www.transparency.org/news-room/infocus/2005/
cpi_2005 (last visited July 27, 2008). Even after most of the countries in the hemisphere
have signed, ratified, and implemented legislation to adopt the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, bribes continue to be the biggest problem in the region.
See Paul Constance, Inside the Beast, IDB AMERICA, Mar. 2002, available at
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and political instability 172 and renders impotent government institutions
in which the separation of powers is frequently encroached upon by a
bullying executive branch. 173  Furthermore, the independence of the
judiciary continue to be undermined by the political interests and
subterfuge within the other political branches.1 74  Economic inequity
remains high throughout the region and massive poverty overstresses the
ability of governments and non-government institutions to bring relief.
Even efforts to bring change are met with skeptical apathy in a region
where political tradition suggests that "reformers are crooks waiting in
the opposition.
1 75
V. Proposals to Achieve the Balance
The rule of law and its benefits under democratic systems in Latin
America are of an ephemeral and elusive character; it is not sustained
merely by undertaking and holding elections or establishing free trade
agendas for stimulating trade and commerce. As in other regions of the
world where democratic institutions form the foundations of government,
"the ability to create a rule of law helps determine democracy's character
http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=385. In Peru, for example, the
Montesinos-Fujimori corruption case uncovered a widespread network of criminal
activity that resulted in the prosecution of 1200 individuals in all three branches of
government, as well as in the military, in the electoral system, and in the press. See John
MacMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy; Montesinoes in Peru, J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 2004, at 69-92.
172. Ecuador has seen seven presidents come and go since 1996, with one holding
office for just three days. See Mi Poder en la Constituci6n,
http://www.ecuaworld.com/discover/president.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2008) (listing
Ecuador's presidents and their terms). On June 6, 2005, after nine months in office,
Bolivian President Carlos Mesa was forced to resign by the country's indigenous
population. This was Bolivia's second president in less than two years. In 2000, Peru's
Fujimori announced that he would run for a third term despite a constitutional restriction
to two terms. His winning was tainted with vote fraud allegations and boycotts. In the
face of overwhelming corruption allegations, Fujimori fled to Japan and resigned. In
2001, Argentina's economic collapse caused serious political instability, resulting in the
appointment of six presidents in four years, five of whom served over a period of just two
weeks. See Harold Trinkunas & Jack Boureston, Financial and Political Crisis in
Argentina: Walking a Wobbly Tightrope, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Mar. 2002, available at
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/mar02/latinArnerica.pdf.
173. On April 4, 1992, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the national
Congress in what became known as the "auto-coup." See U.S. Dep't of State,
Background Note: Peru, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35762.htm (last visited Aug. 4,
2008). He then revised the Constitution, called new congressional elections, and
implemented substantial economic reforms. See id.
174. For a review of presidential hubris in Latin America, see Human Rights Watch,
Rigging the Rule of Law: International Norms on Judicial Independence,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/venezuela0604/2.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2008).
175. See Jorge Dominguez, Latin America's Crisis of Representation, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 1997, at 100.
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and future prospects."1 76 Democratic nations require institutions that are
effective and efficient, with a participatory civil society and rulers who
are responsive to the society's needs and accountable for their conduct in
office. Governments need to lead competently by offering pragmatic and
attainable solutions to the myriad criminal and socio-political challenges
facing the region.
How then can Latin American nations involved in combating
internal and global terrorism and assaults against the civil society by
illegal armed groups while protecting the rule of law achieve the
intended goals in bringing terrorists and illegal armed combatants to
justice while demonstrating a strong commitment to human rights? The
best solution would be to look to models that are already underway
elsewhere in the world by organizations that have implemented viable
rule of law strategies. The United States military is one such entity that
has devoted considerable effort to articulating the rule of law in the
context of conducting security and peacekeeping operations while
preserving human rights as a principle that:
" Includes the application of the Charter of the United
Nations, international humanitarian law, human rights law,
military law, criminal law and procedure, and constitutional
law.
* Incorporates principles that govern civil and criminal
accountability for management and conduct of peace
operations (hereafter referred to as peacekeepers).
* Includes standards by which national institutions of the host
country may be held accountable for their failure to comply
with universal legal principles and rules.
* Is the framework that governs the relationship between
intervening forces and the local community; and the basis
upon which the local population may be held accountable
for their actions prior to, and following, the intervention.
177
From a security perspective, the rule of law entails the
establishment and support of those systems and organizations that can
fight against threats to the rule of law while fortifying components
crucial to the preservation of the civil society, namely regional and
national law enforcement agencies; judicial systems; a functioning legal
system based on written codes and regulations; human rights monitoring
capabilities; and a functioning government structure at local and national
levels that are representative of the people and devoted to enforcing the
176. UNGAR, supra note 3, at 1.
177. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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moral underpinnings of social order. 78 But how can these goals be
achieved?
First, Latin American nation states must recognize that the rule of
law forms the core of protection of human rights, specifically:
prohibiting arbitrary detentions, ensuring fair trials of accused by an
independent and impartial judiciary interpreting laws that are capable of
being obeyed, and ensuring that all individuals are held as being equal
before the law. 1
79
Second, Latin American nation states should advocate for the
development and implementation of reliable human rights monitoring.
Furthermore, states should pursue international training and education
programs that reinforce existing human rights laws, particularly those
regions where the war on terror and illegal armed groups is waged.
Third, Latin American nation states committed to the war against
terrorism should advocate more forcefully for the establishment of a
universal and comprehensive mechanism at the international level,
specifically the United Nations, "to monitor the compatibility of
domestic counter-terrorism measures with international norms and
human rights, especially such measures related to the implementation of
Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001 ."18°
Fourth, Latin American nation states must induce the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, and interested non-
government organizations to develop the mechanisms to monitor and
ensure compliance of member states with their international human
rights obligations. This element could be achieved by adopting the
recommendations set forth in the joint non-government organization
Declaration on the Need for an International Mechanism to Monitor
Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism:
(a) have the capacity to undertake in situ visits;
(b) establish a dialogue and enhanced cooperation with the
UN Security Council with a view to assisting States to
better meet their human rights obligations in implementing
UN Security Council resolution 1373;
(c) engage with and take into account the observations and
recommendations of all relevant treaty bodies;
(d) engage with and take into account the analyses,
observations and recommendations of all Relevant
Charter-based organs;
178. See id. at 8.
179. See Chesterman, supra note 36, at 344.
180. See Joint Declaration on the Need for an International Mechanism to Monitor
Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/j oint
declarationl21 la.pdf (last visited May 14, 2008).
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(e) engage with and take into account also the analyses,
observations and recommendations of regional institutions
and mechanisms;
(f) Coordinate activities with the UN Human Rights
Council)
81
Fifth, Latin American nation states must crack down on the
financial apparatus, loopholes, conduits, and corridors that continue to
provide the ways and means for terrorist groups to continue operations.
Better enforcement of mutual assistance protocols and stronger
commitments by nation states to abide to conventions to combat money
laundering would go a long way to combat terrorism at its roots without
threatening human rights conditions.
Sixth, Latin American nation states must strengthen the resolve to
isolate nation states within the region and beyond that sponsor terrorism
by prosecuting any actors engaged in circumventing international efforts
to pressure pariah states into abandoning support for terrorists groups.
Seventh, Latin American nation states must provide the resources
and cooperative mechanisms over the long term to crack down on
international organized crime and the criminal activities, such as drug
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and document counterfeiting that
provide funding and materiel for terrorist organizations
Eighth, Latin American nation states must exert far tighter border
controls to reduce the inflow of terrorist elements across porous borders
while doing more to contain internal armed conflict from spillover.
Ninth, Latin American nation states must drastically increase the
level of transparency and accountability within the agencies and security
forces involved in combating terrorism and illegal armed groups, and
prosecute to the fullest extent of the law any government actors,
representatives, and other individuals found to be in violation of
international law.
VI. Conclusion
How Latin American nation states choose to prosecute the war
against terrorism and illegal armed groups with regard to respecting
human rights obligations can set an example for how other nation states
conduct themselves in their own efforts to counter terrorism and illegal
armed groups domestically or in concert with multinational actions. Can
there be a framework in which security objectives can be achieved
without infringing on fundamental freedoms? Yes, but there must be
181. Id.
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resolve, consistency, and clarity on the part of all nations to retain the
moral high ground.
In the final analysis, it must be up to the Latin American nation
states individually (based on national consensus) and in concert (through
the Organization of American States, and United Nations, and with the
input of the United States and involved non-government organizations)
to determine how best to define and enforce the rule of law, using the
best possible models available from international sources as lodestones
for action. While political will is essential, 82 the most critical element
for protecting the rule of law from attack while preserving human rights
is the legal component. "That component must contain a clear mandate
that allows the legal mechanism to function and provides for the power
of the court, the international police and prosecutors. If this fails there
will be no substance within the system."
'1 83
182. See U.S. ARMY REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
183. See id. at 20.
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